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Robin L. Lumsdaine, James H. Stock, and David A. Wise 
The retirement effects of U.S. Social Security provisions have been the subject 
of study for some time. The scheduled phased increase in the Social Security 
normal retirement age motivates continued interest in the effects of the provis- 
ions. In considering changes in Social Security provisions and in contemplat- 
ing the effects of the changes, attention has been directed primarily to the So- 
cial  Security provisions themselves. The  potential interaction between  the 
effects of  Social Security and the effects of employer-provided pension plan 
provisions has been largely ignored. Yet  about half of American workers are 
covered by employer pension plans, and about two-thirds of these are covered 
by defined-benefit  plans. These plans typically have very substantial retirement 
incentives and in a large proportion of cases are likely to dominate the effect 
of Social Security provisions. This paper considers the interaction between the 
effects of  Social Security and employer-provided pension plans. We  also give 
attention to the retirement effects of health benefits and to other provisions that 
may affect retirement. 
The analysis rests on and continues our ongoing study of  the retirement 
effects of employer-provided pension plans. The illustrations in this paper are 
based on data from “Firm 111.” We analyzed the Firm I11 data in an earlier paper 
(Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise 1994), and this paper uses the results from that 
paper as a starting point for the analysis presented here. Our work to date has 
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emphasized the dramatic effect of employer-provided pension plan provisions 
on age of retirement and the enormous effects of changing the provisions. The 
work has also highlighted the important limitations of using Social Security 
provisions to predict retirement behavior, without accounting for the effect of 
employer pension plan provisions, which, for employees who have such plans, 
is typically much more powerful than the effect of Social Security provisions. 
In two initial papers, Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b) developed an “option 
value” model of retirement. The central feature of this model is that in deciding 
whether to retire, employees are assumed to compare the “value” of  retiring 
now to the maximum ofthe expected values of retiring at all future retirement 
ages. If the maximum of the future values is greater than the value of retirement 
now, the employee continues to work. We tested the predictive validity of this 
model in two ways: First, we considered the “within-sample fit” of the model 
by  comparing the actual pattern of retirement by age to the pattern predicted 
by  the model, based on the data used for estimation. Second, in papers  by 
Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1990, 1991) we emphasized an external “out-of- 
sample” check of predictive validity by considering how well the model pre- 
dicted the effect on retirement of  an unanticipated and temporary change in 
the pension plan provisions occasioned by an early retirement window plan. 
In a subsequent paper, Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1992) compared the pre- 
dictive validity of  the option value model and two versions of stochastic dy- 
namic programming models. The stochastic dynamic programming model is 
close in spirit to the option value model, but the prediction of retirement is 
based on the comparison of  the value of retirement now to the expected value 
of the maximum of  the values of future retirement ages. The evidence was that 
the option value model predicted just as well as the stochastic dynamic pro- 
gramming models but had the advantage of being much less complex numeri- 
cally. This finding was repeated in Lumsdaine et al. (1994) using Firm I11 data. 
Ausink (1991) pursued a similar comparison based on retirement from the mil- 
itary and found that the option value version was noticeably better than the 
stochastic dynamic programming versions. The simulations in this paper are 
thus based on the option value model. 
The use of firm data was motivated by the absence of information on pension 
plan provisions in standard data sources, such as the Retirement History Sur- 
vey, and by the realization that the incentives inherent in such plans could be 
very substantial and varied widely among firms (see, e.g., Bulow 1981; Lazear 
1983; Kotlikoff and Wise  1985, 1987, 1988). Our work to date shows quite 
similar results for three firms. Thus, although the results in this paper are based 
on a single illustrative employer pension plan, we believe that the findings are 
representative of typical firms with defined-benefit plans. 
The results are presented in the form of simulated effects of changes in the 
employer pension plan and Social Security provisions. The predicted retire- 
ment rates based on option value model estimates serve as the base with which 
simulated retirement rates under new provisions are compared. We begin in 263  Retirement Incentives 
section 11.1 with a description of the firm plan, emphasizing its key provisions. 
The model used in the analysis and the empirical results are then explained. 
This material is largely abstracted from Lumsdaine et al. (1994). The effects 
of changes in provisions are discussed in section 11.2. A summary of findings 
is presented in section 11.3. 
11.1  The Firm 111 Pension Plan and the Retirement Model 
11.1.1  The Employer-Provided Pension Plan 
Employees are covered by  a defined-benefit pension plan with normal retire- 
ment at age 65 and early retirement at age 55. Cliff vesting occurs at 10 years 
of service, with the exception that employees are vested at age 65 even if they 
have fewer than  10 years of  service. The normal retirement benefit at age 65 
depends on earnings, age, and years of service at retirement (i.e., at the time 
of  departure from the firm). A person can retire and elect to start receiving 
benefits before age 65, but the normal benefit will be reduced by 5 percent for 
each year that receipt of benefits precedes age 65, as shown in figure 11.1. A 
person who retired at age 55, for example, would receive 50 percent of  the 
normal retirement benefit of a person who left the firm at age 65. (The normal 
benefit also depends on years of service at the time of retirement.) 
However, if a person has 30 years of service at retirement and is aged 60 or 
older, the person is eligible for 100 percent of the normal benefit. Benefits are 
Hired After 1951  1 30 or More YOS  j 
100 
-  c  E 75 
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reduced 5 percent for each year that retirement precedes age 60, if the person 
has 30 years of  service. For example, a person who retired at age 55 with 30 
years of service would receive 75 percent of the normal benefit. 
Even a person who retires before age 55 and is vested can elect to receive 
benefits from the pension plan as early as age 55, but as for the post-55 retiree, 
benefits are reduced 5 percent for each year that receipt of the benefits precedes 
age 65. Of course, this person’s benefits would be based on earnings, age, and 
years of service at the time of retirement, unadjusted for earnings inflation, and 
would thus be lower than the benefits of a person who retired later. 
Employees who joined the firm before 1951 can retire as early as age 50 and 
begin to receive benefits immediately, but at a reduced rate. An employee hired 
before  1951 had at least 31 years of service in  1982. The reduction for this 
group is indicated by the extended line that indicates benefits at age 50 of 54.3 
percent of the age 60 benefits for an employee who has 30 or more years of 
To demonstrate the effect of the pension plan provisions, figure 11.U  shows 
the expected future compensation of a person from our sample who is 5  1 years 
old and has  been employed by  the firm for 23 years. To compute the data 
graphed in figures 11.2A-11.2E,  a 5 percent real discount rate and a 6 percent 
inflation rate are assumed. The discount rate is estimated in the empirical anal- 
ysis, and the inflation rate is assumed to be 6 percent. Total compensation from 
the firm can be viewed as the sum of wage earnings, the accrual of  pension 
benefits, and the accrual of Social Security benefits. (This omits medical and 
other unobserved  benefits  that should be included as compensation,  but for 
which we have no firm data.) As compensation for working another year the 
employee receives salary earnings. Compensation is also received in the form 
of future pension benefits. The annual compensation in this form is the change 
in the present value of the future pension benefit entitlement due to working 
an additional year. This accrual is comparable to wage earnings. The accrual 
of Social Security benefits may be calculated in a similar manner and is also 
comparable to wage earnings. Figure 11.U  shows the present value at age 5 1 
of expected future compensation in all three forms. Wage earnings represents 
cumulated earnings, by age of retirement from the firm (more precisely, by age 
of  departure  from the firm,  since some workers  might continue  to work  in 
another job). For example, the cumulated earnings of this employee between 
age 51 and age 60 were he to retire at age 60 would be about $482,000, dis- 
counted to age 51 dollars. The slope of  the earnings line represents  annual 
earnings discounted to age 5 1 dollars. 
The pension  line  shows the  accrual  of  firm pension  benefits,  again  dis- 
counted to age 5  1 dollars. It is graphed separately with Social Security accrual 
in figure 11.2E. The shape of  this profile is determined by  the pension plan 
provisions. The present value of accrued pension benefit entitlement at age 5 1 
is about $54,000. The present value of retirement benefits increases between 
ages 51  and 57 because years of service and nominal earnings increase. An 265  Retirement Incentives 
employee could leave the firm at age 53, for example. If he were to do that and 
were vested in the firm’s pension plan, he would be entitled to normal retire- 
ment pension benefits at age 65, based on his years of  service and nominal 
dollar earnings at age 53. He could choose to start receiving benefits as early 
as age 55, the pension early retirement age, but the benefit amount would be 
reduced 5 percent for each year that the receipt of  benefits preceded age 65. 
Because 5 percent is less than the actuarially fair discount rate, the present 
value of  benefits of  a person who leaves the firm before age 55 are always 
greatest if receipt of benefits begins at age 55. 
Recall that a person who has accumulated 30 years of service and is age 55 
or older is entitled to increased retirement benefits that would reach 100 per- 
cent of normal retirement benefits at age 60. No early retirement reduction is 
applied to benefits if they are taken then. So a person at age 60 with 30 years 
of  service who continues to work will no longer gain 5 percent a year from 
fewer years of early retirement reduction, as occurs before age 60. There is a 
jump in the benefits of a person younger than age 60 who attains 30 years of 
service. That accounts for the jump in the benefits of  the person depicted in 
figure 11.2A, when he attains 30 years of service at age 58. 
The Social Security accrual profile is determined by the Social Security ben- 
efit provisions. The present value of  accrued Social Security benefit entitle- 
ment at age 51 is about $33,000. Social Security benefits cannot begin until 
age 62. If real earnings do not change much between ages 5 1 and 62, then real 
Social Security benefits at age 62 will not change much either. After age 62, 
the actuarial adjustment is such that the present value of benefits, evaluated at 
the age of retirement, does not depend on the retirement age. But the present 
value of  the benefits discounted to the same age (51 in this case) declines. 
There is a further drop after age 65 because the actuarial adjustment is reduced 
from 7 percent to 3 percent. 
The top line in fig.  1  I .2 shows total compensation. For example, the wage 
earnings of  an employee who left the firm at age 60 would increase $482,000 
between ages 5 1 and 60, shown by the wage earnings line. Thereafter, the em- 
ployee would receive firm pension plan and Social Security retirement benefits 
with a present value-at  age 51-of  about $170,000. The sum of the two is 
about $652,000, shown by  the top line. Compared to total compensation of 
$575,000 between ages 51 and 60, an average of $63,000 per year, total com- 
pensation between ages 60 and 65 would be only $100,000, or $23,000 per 
year.  Thus the  monetary  reward  for continued work  declines dramatically 
with age. 
Figures 11.2B through  11.20 show comparable compensation profiles for 
employees who are aged 57, 60, and 64, respectively, in 1982; they have 29, 
38, and 45 years of  service, respectively. The person depicted in figure 11.2B 
attains 30 years of service at age 58, thus the jump in pension benefits at that 
age. The present value of pension plus Social Security compensation reaches 
a maximum at age 59 and declines thereafter. Were this employee to continue 266  Robin L. Lumsdaine, James H. Stock, and David A. Wise 
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Future compensation for person aged 57 with 29 years of service 
to work after age 59, until age 65, the present value of total retirement benefits 
would fall by $33,000, offsetting about 28 percent of the present value of wage 
earnings over this period  ($: 17,000). A similar prospect faces the employee 
depicted in figure Il.ZC, but this employee is already entitled to 100 percent 
of normal retirement benefits and loses benefits for each year that he continues 
to work. 
The employee who faces the figure 11.20 compensation profile is 64 years 
old and loses both pension and Social Security benefits for each year that re- [ P  ss  +  Pension  +  Pen+SS -  Wage  -  TOI Comp 1 
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tirement is postponed. At age 65, for example, about 54 percent of expected 
wage earnings would be offset by a reduction in retirement benefits, if retire- 
ment were postponed. 
11.1.2  The 1983 Window 
To evaluate the predictive validity of the estimated model, we use estimates 
based on data for an earlier year to predict retirement under the subsequent 
1983 window plan. Under the window plan, which was in effect from January 
1 to February 28, all employees were eligible for a separation bonus, but the 
most generous payments were available to persons aged 55 and older who had 
at least 21 years of service. Retirement benefits for this group were increased 
depending on age and years of service. For example, a person aged 59 with 28 
years of service could receive  100 percent of  normal retirement benefits,  in- 
stead of  70 percent under the regular plan. That is, this person’s retirement 
benefit would be increased by  43 percent. A person aged 55 with 21 years of 
service could receive 55 percent of normal benefits, instead of 50 percent. Per- 
sons aged 60 or older with 30 years of service were eligible for 100 percent of 
normal benefits under the regular plan. 
In addition, all employees were eligible for a separation bonus equal to one 
week’s pay for every year of service, with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 
26 weeks of pay. Thus even persons who were under 55 years old and those 
who were eligible for 100  percent of normal retirement benefits faced an added 
inducement to retire. 
I 1.1.3  Estimation 
The Dutu 
The data used in the analysis are drawn from the personnel records of  all 
persons employed by the firm at any time between 1979 and 1988. A year-end 
file is available for each year. Earnings records back to 1979 (or to the date of 
hire if after 1979) are available for each employee. In addition, the data contain 
some demographic information  such as date of birth, gender, marital  status, 
and occupational group. The retirement date of employees who retire is also 
known. (More generally, the date of any departure is known, and the reason for 
the departure is recorded.) Thus we are able to determine whether a person 
who was employed at age a was also employed at age a + 1, and if not, the 
exact age at which the employee left the firm. 
The estimation of the retirement model in this paper is based on 1982 data, 
whether or not an employee left the firm in 1982. (To simplify the determina- 
tion of age of retirement, only employees born in January and February who 
had not retired before  1 March  1982 are used in this analysis.) The primary 
test of the predictive validity  of  the model is based on how well the model, 
estimated on 1982 data, predicts retirement under the  1983 window plan that 
substantially increased standard retirement benefits. 269  Retirement Incentives 
The Option Vulue Model 
The model is described in detail in Stock and Wise (1990b) and is explained 
only briefly here. At any given age, based on information available at that age, 
it is assumed that an employee compares the expected present value of retiring 
at that age with the value of retiring at each age in the future through age 70. 
The maximum  of the expected  present values of retiring at each future age 
minus the expected present value of immediate retirement is called the option 
value of postponing retirement. A person who does not retire this year main- 
tains the option of retiring at a more advantageous age later on. If  the option 
value  is positive, the person  continues  to work;  otherwise  she retires. With 
reference to figure  11.1, for example, at age 5 1 the employee would compare 
the value of the retirement benefits that she would receive were she to retire 
then-approximately  $87,000-with  the value of  wage earnings and retire- 
ment benefits in each future year. The expected present value of retiring at age 
60 (discounted to age 51), for example, is about $652,000. Future earnings 
forecasts are based on the individual's past earnings, as well as the earnings of 
other persons in the firm. The precise model specification follows. 
A person at age t who continues to work will earn Y5  at subsequent ages s. 
If the person retires at age r, subsequent retirement benefits will be Bs(r).  These 
benefits will depend on the person's age and years of service at retirement and 
on his earnings  history; thus they  are a function  of  the retirement  age. We 
suppose that in deciding whether to retire the person weighs the indirect utility 
that will be received from future income. Discounted to age tat  the rate P, the 
value of this future stream of income if retirement is at age r is given by 
(1)  V,(r)  = C:z:Ph-'U,(Y.,) + C~,,P"U,(B,(r)), 
where U,(  Ys)  is the indirect utility of future wage income and UJBJr))  is the 
indirect utility  of future retirement benefits.  It is assumed that the employee 
will not live past age S. The expected gain, evaluated at age t, from postponing 
retirement until age r is given by 
(2)  G,(r) = E,V,(r) -  E,V,(t). 
Letting r*  be the age that gives the maximum expected gain, the person will 
postpone retirement if the option value, G,(r*),  is positive, 
(3)  G,(r*)  = E,V,(r*) -  E,V,(t) > 0. 
The utilities of future wage and retirement income are parameterized as 
(4a) 
(4b) 
U,(YJ  = YT + wv> 
U,(Bs) = [kB>(r)lv  + t7> 
where w, and  $.y  are individual-specific random effects, assumed to follow a 
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The parameter k is incorporated to recognize that in considering whether to 
retire, the utility associated with a dollar of income while retired may be differ- 
ent from the utility associated with a dollar of income accompanied by work. 
Abstracting from the random terms, at any given age s, the ratio of the utility 
of retirement to the utility of employment is [k(B,lYJ]y. 
Parameter Estimates 
The parameter estimates for men and women are shown in table 11.1. The 
estimates for y suggest some risk aversion. We have typically found estimates 
closer to 1, suggesting that with respect to retirement income, employees are 
essentially risk neutral. The estimated value of k is 2.580 for men and 1.329 for 
women. The estimate for men, for example, suggests that a dollar of retirement 
benefit income-unaccompanied  by work-is  valued more than 2.5 times as 
much as a dollar of income that is accompanied by work. The estimated values 
of p suggest discount rates between 3 and 25 percent. 
The model fits the data quite well, and this is shown graphically in figures 
11.3A through 11.3C for men. The principal discrepancy between actual and 
predicted rates occurs at age 65,  with the actual rate substantially greater than 
the predicted rate. The predicted and actual cumulative departure rates are very 
close. The primary test of the predictive validity of the model is how well it 
predicts retirement rates under the 1983 window plan. The model predictions 
capture the general pattern of  retirement under the window, but underpredict 
retirement rates of persons aged 55 or older, as shown in figure 1  I .3C. 
Table 11.1  Parameter Estimates by Gender 
Men and 
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Simulated retirement rates under the plan changes discussed below are typi- 
cally compared to the predicted rates in figures 11.3A and 11.3B. 
11.2  Simulations 
We  consider first the effect on retirement of  several provisions of the firm 
pension plan. The effect of specific changes in Social Security provisions are 
then considered. These are the actual changes that are scheduled to be phased 
in over the next 30 years. Then changes in both firm pension and Social Secu- 
rity provisions are considered. We  explore in a very provisional manner the 
effect of retiree health insurance on retirement. To understand how the elimina- 
tion of mandatory retirement may have affected departure rates, we consider 
departure rates if 65 were the mandatory retirement age. The effects of a de- 
fined contribution instead of the firm defined-benefit plan are also investigated. 
Finally, we simulate, again in a very provisional manner, the effect of postre- 
tirement employment at a reduced salary, compared to the currently typical 
move from full-time work to retirement. 
1 1.2.1  Changes in the Firm Plan Provisions 
We consider each of several firm plan provisions: the early retirement reduc- 
tion factor, increased benefits for persons with 30 years of service (which we 
refer to as the “30-year provision”), and the early retirement age. 
Actuarially fair early retirement reduction. An important feature of  the firm 
plan is that the 5 percent per year reduction in benefits if they are taken before 
normal retirement-the  early retirement reduction-is  less than actuarially 
fair. An actuarially fair reduction would be about 7 percent, instead of 5 per- 
cent. The effect of changing to an actuarially fair reduction is shown in figure 
11.4. The effect is concentrated among employees 56-59  years old. With the 
fair reduction, only 22 percent of persons employed at age 50 would have re- 
tired by age 59, compared to 29 percent under the 5 percent reduction factor. 
The effect at older ages would apparently be greater were it not for the 30-year 
provision, which has an important effect on retirement as employees approach 
age 60. 
The 30-year  provision. As described with reference to figure 11.1,  the firm plan 
also provides for increased benefits when 30 years of  service are attained. At 
age 60, for example, a person with 30 years of service is eligible for 100 per- 
cent of normal retirement benefits. The effect of eliminating this provision is 
shown in figure 11.5. The effects are substantial, reducing from 41 percent to 
29 percent the proportion retired by age 60 and from 64 percent to 46 percent 
the proportion retired by age 62. The age 60 departure rate is reduced by  more 
than 50 percent. Figure 11.4A  Simulation-Firm  Actuarially Fair Early Retirement Reduction: 
Data 
Retirement Rates  Cumulative Rates 
Age  Base  Simulation  Difference  Base  Simulation  Difference 
50  0  0  0  0  0  0 
51  0.007  0.006  -0.001  0.007  0.006  -0.001 
52  0.009  0.008  -0.001  0.016  0.015  -0.001 
53  0.01  0.012  0.002  0.025  0.026  0.001 
54  0.016  0.018  0.002  0.041  0.044  0.003 
55  0.029  0.026  -0.003  0.068  0.069  0.001 
56  0.036  0.03  -0.006  0.102  0.097  -0.005 
57  0.056  0.044  -0.012  0.152  0.136  -0.016 
58  0.067  0.051  -0.016  0.208  0.18  -0.028 
59  0.106  0.05  1  -0.055  0.292  0.223  -0.069 
60  0.169  0.161  -0.008  0.412  0.348  -0.064 
61  0.165  0.158  -0.007  0.509  0.45 1  -0.058 
62  0.262  0.25  -0.012  0.637  0.588  -0.049 
63  0.22  0.222  0.002  0.717  0.68  -0.037 
64  0.249  0.235  -0.014  0.788  0.755  -0.033 
65  0.35  0.35  0  0.862  0.841  -0.02  1 
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Early retirement at age 60 instead of age 55. Under the current firm plan, em- 
ployees can begin to receive pension benefits at age 55. Suppose that the early 
retirement age were 60 instead of 55. There would be a very substantial reduc- 
tion in departure rates before age 60, as shown in figure 11.6. Indeed, in this 
firm, almost no employee would retire before age 60. Under the current plan, 
41 percent of  persons employed at age 55 would have retired before age 60, 
according to our predictions. But if  early retirement were at age 60, only 4 
percent would retire before age 60. 
Early retirement at age 62 instead of age 55. In this case, we suppose that early 
retirement is at age 62-the  same as the Social Security early retirement age- 
and that the 30-year provision provides 100 percent benefits at age 62, instead 
of age 60. The results are much like those discussed just above, except that in 
this case retirement tends to be delayed until age 62, as shown in figure 11.7. 
The percentage retired before age 62 is reduced from 51 percent to 8 percent. 
The simulations make it clear that employees are unlikely to retire before pen- 
sion retirement benefits can be received. This is consistent with the evidence 
that most American families have very limited personal financial assets on the 
eve of  retirement and would be unable to support themselves in retirement 
without employer-provided pension or Social Security benefits. 
In general, the firm pension plan provisions have  an  important effect on 
retirement. The simulations below show that for persons with a firm plan like 
the one presented here, changes in Social Security provisions are much less im- 
portant. 
11.2.2  Changes in Social Security Provisions 
We  consider three changes in Social Security provisions: actuarially fair in- 
creases in benefits after age 65, an increase in the normal retirement age to 67, 
and both changes together. 
Actuarially fair post-65 benefit increases. Under current Social Security pro- 
visions, benefits are increased only 3  percent per year if  receipt of benefits 
begins after age 65. An actuarially fair increase would be close to 7 percent. 
The effect of  this change is shown in figure 11.8. The aggregate effects are 
small, although the age 65 departure is reduced from 35 percent to 29 percent. 
The proportion retired by age 65 is reduced only from 86 percent to 85 percent. 
This is because a large fraction of firm  employees have already retired by age 
65, and thus an increase in the retirement rate of the small proportion that is 
still working at that age has only a small effect on cumulative retirement. 
An increase in the Social Security normal retirement age from 65 to 67. Over 
the next three decades the Social Security normal retirement age is scheduled 
to increase from 65 to 67. The Social Security early retirement age will remain 
at 62, but benefits will be reduced actuarially from full benefits at age 67, Figure 11.6A  Simulation-Firm  Earls Retirement at Age 60, Not Age 55: Data 
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instead of  age 65. The simulated effects of this change are shown in figure 
11.9. Again, although the retirement rates of persons over age 60 are reduced, 
the aggregate effect is small. The retirement rate of persons aged 62, for ex- 
ample, is reduced from 26 percent to 23 percent and the rate of persons aged 
65 from 35 percent to 26 percent. But the percentage of 50-year-olds retired 
by age 65 is reduced only from 86 percent to 83 percent. 
An increase in the Social Security normal retirement age from 65 to 67 and 
actuarially fair post-67 benejit increases. Combining the two changes above 
yields results much like the latter change alone, as shown in figure 11.10.  There 
is a noticeable effect on retirement rates of persons aged 62 or older, but the 
cumulative effect is small, reducing the percentage retired by age 65 only by 
3 percentage points, from 86  percent to 83 percent. Thus, compared to changes 
in the firm plan provisions, the effect of the scheduled changes in Social Secu- 
rity provisions is very small. 
No Social Security early retirement or no Social Security. Although the effect 
of the proposed Social Security changes is small, and even eliminating Social 
Security early retirement would have a small effect, no Social Security at all 
would have a substantial effect. As shown in figure 11.11, eliminating Social 
Security early retirement would have only a modest effect on cumulative de- 
parture rates from this firm, reducing departures by age 65 from 86 percent to 
80 percent, although departure rates for ages 62-64  are reduced substantially. 
But no Social Security benefits at all would reduce departure rates by age 65 
from 86 percent to 67 percent, as shown in figure 11.12. Thus it would be 
inaccurate to say, with respect to its effect on retirement, that Social Security 
by itself does not matter. 
11.2.3  Social Security and Firm Provisions “Coordinated” 
If the scheduled Social Security changes are imposed and the firm provis- 
ions were changed to “correspond” to the Social Security provisions, the ef- 
fects would be much like the corresponding effects if only the firm plan provis- 
ions were changed. We consider two versions: (1) the firm early retirement age 
is increased to 62 and the firm 30-year provision applies at age 62 instead of 
age 60 (as in fig. 11.7 above) and (2) the firm early retirement age is increased 
to 62 and the 30-year provision applies at age 62 instead of age 60 and the firm 
normal retirement age is increased from 65 to 67. 
Social Security scheduled changes andjrm  early retirement at age 62. The 
effect of this change can be compared to the firm change without any change 
in Social Security provisions, described in figure 11.7. The effect of the joint 
change-shown  in figure 11.13-is  very large, but the comparison with figure 
11.7 makes clear that most of the effect is due to the change in the firm plan. 
Retirement before age 62 is reduced from 5 1 percent to 8 percent, the same as Figure 11.9A  Simulation-Social  Security Retirement at Age 67, Not Age 65: Data 
Retirement Rates  Cumulative Rates 
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Age  Base  Simulation  Difference  Base  Simulation  Difference 
50  0  0 
51  0.007  0.01 
52  0.009  0.008 
53  0.01  0.008 
54  0.0 16  0.006 
55  0.029  0.006 
56  0.036  0.006 
57  0.056  0.006 
58  0.067  0.007 
59  0.106  0.009 
60  0.169  0.008 
61  0.165  0.01 1 
62  0.262  0.262 
63  0.22  0.22 
64  0.249  0.249 
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in figure 11.7. Retirement by age 65 is reduced from 86 percent to 72 percent; 
the reduction in figure 11.7 is from 86 percent to 74 percent. 
Social Security scheduled changes, firm early retirement at age 62, and $firm 
normal retirement at age 67. If in addition to increasing the firm early retire- 
ment age to 62 the firm normal retirement age were increased to 67, the effect 
on retirement-shown  in figure 11.14-would  be much like the effect shown 
above. But increasing the firm normal retirement age has a substantial effect 
on the departure rates of  older employees. Cumulative departure by  age 65 
would be 64 percent as compared to 72 percent in the case just above and 86 
percent in the base case. Cumulative departure by  age 62 would be 27 percent 
as compared with 32 percent above and 64 percent in the base case. 
11.2.4  Firm Retiree Health Insurance 
Health insurance coverage under Medicare does not  begin until  age 65. 
Whether an employee is eligible for retiree health insurance before age 65 may 
affect the retirement decision. This issue has been analyzed in some detail by 
Gruber and Madrian (1996). Employees in Firm I11  are covered by  employer 
health insurance while they are working and are covered by retiree health insur- 
ance after retirement. An employee who retires at age 55, for example, would 
be covered by retiree health insurance. The retiree plan is essentially the same 
as the current employee plan. After age 65, however, the plan pays only for 
care that is not covered by Medicare but is covered by the employer plan; the 
employer is the payer of  last resort. It is unclear how persons value health 
insurance. In particular, the dollar cost of purchasing the insurance may not be 
an adequate measure of the value of the insurance. Nonetheless, to gain some 
insight as to how retiree insurance coverage might affect retirement, suppose 
there were no retiree insurance so that employees who retired before age 65 
would have to purchase insurance privately. We  assume that the cost would be 
$1,000 per year until age 65, when the person would be covered by Medicare. 
Therefore, before age 65, we assume that the dollar amount of retirement bene- 
fits would be $1,000 lower, the cost of  the health insurance that the retiree 
would have  to purchase. The effect on retirement is shown in figure  11.15. 
Retirement rates before age 65 are importantly lower, but compared to the 
effect of pension plan provisions, the effect is small. For example, the cumula- 
tive percentage retired by  age 6 1 is reduced from 5 1 percent to 45 percent. In 
contrast, increasing the firm plan early retirement age from 55 to 62 would 
reduce cumulative retirement by age 61 from 5 1 percent to 8 percent, as shown 
in figure 11.7. 
11.2.5  Mandatory Retirement 
Before  1978 mandatory retirement at age 65 was  common in  the United 
States. It is still common in Japan. We consider here how mandatory retirement 
in Firm I11 would change retirement rates. The results are described in figure 
11.16. Only departure rates at ages 64 and 65 are affected by the change; the Figure 11.14A  Simulation-Planned  Social Security Law Changes and Firm Early 
Retirement at Age 62, Normal Retirement at Age 67: Data 
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cumulative effect is small. The age 64  retirement rate, for example, is increased 
from 25 percent to 36 percent. Departure by age 65 is increased from 86 per- 
cent to 91 percent. 
11.2.6  Defined-Contribution versus Defined-Benefit Plan 
Unlike the firm defined-benefit plan under which benefits are determined by 
a formula that can incorporate substantial incentives, benefits under a defined- 
contribution plan are typically determined only by the cumulated assets that 
the employee has in the plan at retirement. Other than the level of assets, there 
are no plan incentive effects that encourage or discourage retirement at specific 
ages. To provide some idea of how retirement might change under such a plan, 
we assume that individual pension assets accumulate with years of employ- 
ment through pension plan contributions equal to 7.5 percent of wage earnings. 
The benefit at retirement is the annuity value of the accumulated assets. Retire- 
ment rates under this plan are described in figure 11.17. Cumulative retirement 
at age 55 is increased from 7 percent to 14 percent; cumulative retirement at 
age 62 is reduced from 64 percent to 60 percent. At age 65, the cumulative rate 
is reduced from 86 percent to 80 percent. In particular, there are no noticeable 
jumps in retirement rates between ages 55 and 6 1,  as there are under the current 
defined-benefit plan. The increased departure rates at younger ages occur be- 
cause under the defined-contribution plan there is no incentive to wait for the 
jump in benefits that would occur at age 55 or at 30 years of service, when the 
30-year provision would apply. 
I I .2.7  Postretirement Work 
The typical American employee goes from full-time work to retirement, al- 
though a small proportion of workers are employed for a short period of time 
after retirement, typically fewer than three years. It may be that gradual with- 
drawal from the labor force would be preferred  to the current practice.  Our 
model estimation does not adequately recognize such possibilities. Nonethe- 
less, to explore how a large change in retirement policy might affect departure 
rates, we consider an option to the present plan that requires persons who retire 
to work half-time (and, correspondingly, receive one-half current salary, with 
no salary increases) until age 70. In this case, we assume that the parameter k 
is 1 until age 70 and is the estimated value after age 70. The results suggest 
that such a plan would lead to much earlier retirement (see fig.  11.18). For 
example, cumulative retirement by age 55 is increased from 7 percent to 44 
percent; the departure rate at age 55 is increased from 3 percent to 12 percent. 
The implication is that under this arrangement the discounted value of retire- 
ment plus pension benefits outweighs the value of continuing to work for many 
employees at a relatively young age. The implementation  of the simulation, 
however, does not recognize the value of the leisure associated with half-time 
work. Were the value of leisure accounted for, the departure rates at younger 
ages would presumably be higher than the simulation implies. Figure 11.17A  Simulation-Defined-Contribution  Plan of 7.5 Percent: Data 
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11.3  Summary 
The results of the analysis support several conclusions. First, changes in key 
firm pension plan provisions would have very substantial effects on retirement. 
For example, increasing the firm early retirement age from 55 to 60 would 
reduce cumulative departure by age 59 from 29 percent to 4  percent. Second, 
the scheduled changes in Social Security provisions would have only a modest 
effect on firm retirement. The firm pension plan provisions dominate the Social 
Security provisions. Third, if changes in firm pension plan and Social Security 
provisions were coordinated-for  example, if in both early retirement were at 
age 62 and normal retirement at age 67-the  effect on retirement would be 
very substantial. For example, cumulative departure by  age 61 would be re- 
duced from 5  I percent to 8 percent. Cumulative departure at age 65 would be 
64 percent as compared with 86 percent in the base case. Although the individ- 
ual simulations cannot be treated as exact, we have confidence in the general 
order of magnitude. In addition, the simulations suggest that the availability of 
retiree health insurance is associated with some increase in retirement between 
ages 55 and 65, although the effect is modest compared to the effect of pension 
plan  provisions on retirement. We  also considered the effect of  very  large 
changes in retirement policy-half-time  work from retirement to age 70. Al- 
though these simulations must be considered as exploratory, the results suggest 
that such changes could change current retirement practices very substantially. 
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